Central administration versus provincial arbitrary governance: Patmos and Mount Athos monasteries in the 16 th century by Kermeli, E.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ybyz20
Download by: [Bilkent University] Date: 01 October 2017, At: 23:51
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies
ISSN: 0307-0131 (Print) 1749-625X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ybyz20
Central administration versus provincial
arbitrary governance: Patmos and Mount Athos
monasteries in the 16th century
Eugenia Kermeli
To cite this article: Eugenia Kermeli (2008) Central administration versus provincial arbitrary
governance: Patmos and Mount Athos monasteries in the 16th century, Byzantine and Modern
Greek Studies, 32:2, 189-202
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/174962508X322678
Published online: 18 Jul 2013.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 16
View related articles 
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies Vol. 32 No. 2 (2008) 189–202
© 2008 Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, University of Birmingham
DOI: 10.1179/174962508X322678
Central administration versus provincial arbitrary
governance: Patmos and Mount Athos monasteries
in the 16th century*
Eugenia Kermeli
Department of History, Bilkent University
The confiscation of monastic properties ordered by Selim II in 1568 served as a catalyst
precipitating a process of negotiation and mutual accommodation between the centre –
represented by the sultan and his jurisconsult- and the periphery articulated by the monks.
Even in formulaic imperial orders, it is apparent that the monastic communities suc-
cessfully negotiated the terms for the normalisation of the affair, whereas the jurisconsult
accommodated the Porte’s interests to the local society’s needs. On the local level, the
judge functioned as a mediator, addressing the monks’ requirements, even if he had to
transgress a number of Islamic rules and imperial orders. Thus, this case study illustrates
the gradual transformation of a polity in dialogue with local communities.
‘All a historian does when she or he attempts the reconstruction of the past by writing it
down is simply a temporary attesting of the fluidity inherent in the historical process’.1
In 1568, what is perceived today as a temporary attesting of fluidity was, for the
subjects of the Ottoman sultan, a reality to be dealt with. Upon his succession to the
throne in 1566, Selim II ordered a new registration of all imperial orders and deeds validat-
ing possession of movable and immovable properties. None of the monks in the monastery
of Saint John the Theologian situated on the remote Aegean island of Patmos and of those
in Dionysiou monastery on Mount Athos could have predicted the intensity of the legal
* A first draft of this paper entitled ‘The Aegean Sea in the 16th century: the archives of Patmos monastery’,
was presented at a workshop organised by the Centre for Byzantine Studies of the National Research Centre of
Greece, 14 January 1997. I would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Professor Oikonomides
who suggested the title. I would also like to thank Professor Zachariadou for guiding me through the archive of
Patmos monastery and for allowing me to see the important firman of Dionysiou monastery.
1 R. A. Abou-El-Haj, ‘A Response to Linda Darling’s review of Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman
































battle that followed. Luckily we can trace the origins of the dispute and describe the way
it unfolded until the time when a final settlement was reached between the Porte and
the monks. The confiscation and repossession of monastic properties illustrates the negoti-
ation process and the argumentation employed by central and local actors in an effort
to solve the dispute. This case elucidates efforts on the part of the Sultan to normalize
complicated — and often conflicting— agrarian and endowment laws. It depicts local
resistance to the commands of the centre and negotiation between centre and periphery in
an effort to reach a viable settlement. Finally, it demonstrates the efforts of the local judge,
ensnared in a web of central commands and local needs.
The Case
Selim II’s order to confiscate monastic properties in 1568 took the monks of Mount Athos
and of Patmos by surprise. It was customary for a new sultan to validate documents issued
by his predecessors. The monks had failed to foresee the change in regard to the land-
system and its taxation. This change was initiated by Selim’s father, the illustrious
Süleyman the Magnificent, otherwise known as the Lawgiver. Süleyman rightfully earned
this last epithet due to the strenuous efforts of one of his most able subjects, the juriscon-
sult (sceyhülislam) Ebu’s Sugud, who was renowned for reconciling the Holy Law (Shariga)
with the Ottoman ‘secular’ law (kanun).2
Ebu’s Sugud had already attempted to create a uniform system with regard to land
and its taxation, and to redefine general principles. The system that applied in the Balkans
until his time was based primarily on custom and imperial legislation. Practice, though,
was not uniform and there was no description of its norms.3 Following the tradition of
Hanafi jurists like Qadikhan, Ibn Bazzaz and Kemalpascazade, Ebu’s Sugud redefined the
basic laws on land tenure and taxation.4 In 1541 Ebu’s Sugud addressed the problem of
2 C. Imber, Ebu’s Sugud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford 1997) passim; H. Inalcik, Ottoman Empire:
the classical age 1300–1600 (New York 1989) 70–73 and ‘Islamization of Ottoman laws on land and land taxa-
tion’, in C. Fragner, K. Schwarz (eds.), Festgabe an Josef Matuz: Osmanistik- Türkologie- Diplomatik (Berlin
1992) 100–116.
3 Imber, Ebu’s Sugud, 122; Inalcik, ‘Islamization’, 157; J. Barnes, An Introduction to Religious Foundations in
the Ottoman Empire (Leiden 1987); A. Akgündüz, OsmanlI Kanunnameleri (Istanbul 1990); Ö. L. Barkan, XV
ve XVIinci asIrlarda OsmanlI dImparatorluhunda zirai ekonominin hukuki va mali esaslar, Kanunlar (Istanbul
1943); H. Lowry, Fifteenth Century Ottoman Realities: Christian peasant life in the Aegean island of Limnos
(Istanbul 2002) and ‘The Ottoman Liva Kanunnames contained in the Defter-i Hakani’, Journal of Ottoman
Studies 2 (1981) 43–74; G. Veinstein, ‘Le législateur ottoman face à l’insularité: l’enseignment des Kânûnnâme’
in N. Vatin, C. Veinstein, eds., Insularités ottomans (Paris 2004) 91–110.































Central administration versus provincial arbitrary governance 191
misappropriation of land and its revenues while drafting the law-book (kanunname) for
Hungary. Nonetheless, customary practices proved tenacious.5 Thus, the significantly old
by now jurisconsult had another golden opportunity to rectify whatever he considered to
be the ‘mistaken supposition’ of peasants (regaya) and even of judges on the issue of land
ownership by supervising the promulgation of a new kanunname for Thessaloniki and
Skopje (1568–1569).6 The same kanunname enunciated the legal grounds for ordering
the confiscation of monastic properties. Thus all title deeds (hüccets) and endowment
documents (vakfIyes) issued by judges became invalid.
There could be a number of reasons behind the late response of the monastic com-
munities to the paramount changes in the system. Like the peasants, the monks had not
yet grasped the nature of the changes in the law on land.7 Using a legal stratagem, Ebu’s
Sugud categorized all land in the empire as ‘royal demesne’ (aradi’l-mamlaka), apart from
lands recognized by the sultanic authority as freeholds (mülk). The cultivators had
acquired the ownership of the usufruct as a loan (gariyya). Thus, the entry fee (tapu),
which a new occupant paid for his land to the fief holder (sipahi), was the advance rent
(ücret-i mugaccele).8 In practice the monks, like the other peasants, continued to treat land
as their freehold, by selling, buying, pre-empting and exchanging it.9
Monastic properties other than land, that is vineyards, orchards, mills, shops, houses,
wine houses, animals and ships were also confiscated on the basis of another legal techni-
cality. Monastic estates had expanded over the centuries as a result of private and imperial
patronage. The Byzantine collections of monastic documents are full of smaller and
bigger gifts and donations.10 Pious Christians donated part or all of their properties to
monasteries in order to have the family name commemorated, others because they died
without issue, or as they entered monastic life. The extent of monastic wealth is
5 Ibid., 122–136.
6 See especially the introductory paragraph of the law book where Ebu’s Sugud explained all these problems:
Barkan, Kanunlar, 298–99.
7 For an extensive analysis of the legal tricks employed by Ebu’s Sugud see Imber, Ebu’s Sugud, 123–125;
B. Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent (London 1988) 84ff; E. Kermeli, ‘Ebu’s Sugud’s Definition
of Church Vakfs: Theory and Practice in Ottoman Law’, in R. Gleave, E. Kermeli, eds., Islamic Law: Theory
and Practice (London 1997, pbk ed. 2001) 146–147.
8 Imber, Ebu’s Sugud 123–124; Kermeli, ‘Church Vakfs’ 146; Inalcik, ‘Islamization’ 159.
9 Imber, Ebu’s Sugud 130, fetva n. 17.
10 A. Laiou Thomadakis, Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire: A Social and Demographic Study
(Princeton 1977) 163ff.; P. Charanis, ‘The monastic properties and the state in the Byzantine Empire’, DOP 4
(1948) 53–118; Mount Athos and Byzantine Monasticism, eds. A. Bryer, M.B. Cunningham, Section III
(Aldershot 1996); J. Thomas, A. Constantinides Hero, Byzantine Monastic Foundations Documents (Washing-
ton, D. C. 2000); E. Vranousi, Bufantin a  ÖEccraQa tg̃z Mong̃z Pa tmou, I (Athens 1980); N. Oikonomides, Actes
de Dionysiou, Archives de l’ Athos, IV (Paris 1968); J. Lefort, N. Oikonomidès, and D. Papachryssanthou,
Actes d’Iviron, Archives de l’Athos XIV (Paris 1985); P. Papageorgiou, ‘G Éen Hessalonaikg mon g tṽn
































interrelated with the history of the various regions under Ottoman rule. War and
conquests were destructive, but recovery was expeditious if diplomacy worked well. Some
communities, such as most Athonite monasteries, even managed to expand under the
Ottomans.11 In certain cases the monasteries acted as the representative of the Christian
peasants to the Porte, assuming the responsibility of paying the peasants’ taxes.12 These
movable and immovable properties accumulated by monasteries were the target of
Ebu’s Sugud who saw a challenge to the imperial authority and finances due to the ever
increasing privilege of the monasteries, to pay their taxes in a lump sum (maktug).
In a legal opinion (fetva) included in the imperial order (firman) Aa40 sent to Patmos
monastery, Ebu’s Sugud formulated his legal reasoning. It is against the law to endow
property and make trusts in mortmain (vakfs) for churches.13 Although Ebu’s Sugud
defended the inheritance rights of the natural heirs of the monks — close and distant
relatives — in another fetva, under the pressure of monastic communities he eventually
had to recognize the collective character of monasteries, despite the restraints emanating
from a legal tradition which does not accept corporations as legal entities.14 By allowing
monks in a monastery to inherit the properties of deceased monks, he circumvented the
complicated Islamic laws of inheritance and redefined the monastic vakfs as family vakfs.15
The negotiation between the monasteries and the Porte in an effort to resolve
the crisis is also of great interest. This process can be seen in two firmans. The first one
initiated the confiscation and was sent to the monastery of Saint John the Theologian in
Patmos, on 6 Cemazi’l-ahir 977/17 November 1569. The second reflected the final stage
of negotiations between the Porte and the monks of Dionysiou monastery in Mount
11 V. Dimitriades, ‘Ottoman Chalkidiki: an area in transition’ in A. Bryer, H. Lowry, eds., Continuity and
Change in late Byzantine and early Ottoman Society (Birmingham 1986) 40–41; G. A. Lavriotes Lazarides, Tao
ÜAcion ÖOroz meta  t gn ÉOhvmanik gn kata ktgsin (Athens 1963) 1–2; J. Haldon, ‘Limnos, monastic holdings and
the Byzantine state: ca. 1261–1453’, in A. Bryer, H. Lowry, eds., Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and
early Ottoman Society (Birmingham 1986) 154–74, 186–88; H. Lowry, ‘The island of Limnos: a case study on
the continuity of Byzantine forms under Ottoman rule’, in A. Bryer, H. Lowry, eds., Continuity and Change in
late Byzantine and early Ottoman Society, 250–53; G. Salakides, Sultanurkunden des Athos- Klosters Vatopedi
aus der Zeit Bayezid II und Selim II (Thessaloniki 1995) 65–76; E. Zachariadou, ‘Ottoman documents from the
archives of Dionysiou (Mount Athos) 1495–1520’, SF 30 (Munich 1971) 23–30 and ‘Early Ottoman documents
of the Prodromos monastery (Serres)’, SF 28 (Munich 1969) 11–12.
12 E. Zachariadou, ‘Sumbolg  stg n ÑIstoraia toũ Notioanatolikoũ AÉicaaiou (mge ÉaQormg  t ga patmiak ga
Wirm ania tṽn Éetṽn 1454–1522), Saummeikta I (Athens 1966) 196–98. E. Balta, ‘Recensements ottomans de
Patmos (XVe-XVIIe s.)’, Peuple et Production: pour une interprétation des sources ottomanes (Istanbul 1999)
61–75.
13 In another article I have discussed his employment of legal stratagems to legitimise the confiscation and
solve a seemingly insuperable problem: Kermeli, ‘Church vakfs’, 147.
14 Kermeli, ‘Church vakfs’, 149; J. Schacht , ‘Early doctrines on Waqf’, Mélanges Fuad Köprülü (Istanbul
1953) 443–52.































Central administration versus provincial arbitrary governance 193
Athos, 13 Saban 976/25 January 1569.16 It seems that the order to confiscate all monastic
properties, at least in the Balkans, was a general one, as copies of the firman initiating
the process are found in almost all monasteries. It is also clear that the confiscation and
repossession of monastic properties was not initiated at the same time. This is apparent
in the dating of the firmans sent to the monasteries of Mount Athos and to the Patmos
monastery. Two reasons are behind the choice of these geographical regions. The first is
methodological: it is important to examine whether the collective power of Mount Athos
monasteries determined the negotiation process between the Porte and the monks. In other
words it would be interesting to see whether the monks of Mount Athos managed to reach
a more favourable arrangement than the monks of Patmos. The second reason is that the
repossession process is well documented in the Patmos monastery archive.
The monasteries then proceeded to negotiate the terms of repossession of properties.
This process is apparent in the firman of Dionysiou monastery which is particularly
interesting as it echoes the ‘voices’ of the monks. It includes a petition that outlines what
is acceptable to the monks and negotiates the terms of the repossession of properties:
At the present time the monks of the monasteries on the shores of the peninsula of
Ayonoroz (Mount Athos) in your kadilIk have presented a petition to the exalted
Porte. ‘Our çiftliks and vineyards and orchards, fields and mills and shops, houses
and wine-shops, our animals and winter pastures in the plain of Longos and goats
and all we have always possessed from old days, in part and in whole, up till now
in the aforementioned kadilIk, the mülks (private possessions) and animals of our
monasteries [these] were [all] sold by the miri (Treasury) By mutual cooperation, all
of us have borrowed and acquired a debt of 14,000 golden coins. We, the monks
living in our monastery, have taken possession of our former lands and animals. We
bought them back to hold on the following condition. According to the previous
decision none of the monks in our monasteries has the freehold of our mentioned
possessions (emlaks), fields, vineyards, windmills, orchards, çiftliks and animals.
They belong in their entirety to the monasteries on the condition that they are used to
feed travellers’.17
The monks are requesting from the Porte to prevent any interference by local
authorities in the event of the death or departure of a monk. According to the Islamic law
16 E.Kermeli, The Confiscation of Monastic Properties by Selim II, 1568–70, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
(Manchester 1997) Appendix III. The firman from Athos, although anterior to the Patmos one, represents
a later phase of the affair. It seems that the process was slow and it was not initiated simultaneously in all
monastic communities in the Balkans. For the Alaca HIsar sancak, see a firman, 22 Rebiü’l-ahir 976/14 October
1568 in A. Fotiç, ‘The official explanations for the confiscation and sale of monasteries (churches) and their
estates at the time of Selim II’, Turcica 26 (1994) 33–54; P. Wittek-P. Lemerle, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire et les
status des monastères athonites sous la domination turque’, Archives d’histoire du Droit oriental 3 (1947)
411–72.
































of inheritance, if no heir claims the deceased’s properties, they revert to the Fisc. The rest
of the monks in the same monastery asked to be recognized as a collective body and not
as individuals. Thus, should one of them die, his property could not be claimed either by
his physical heirs, if any, or by the Fisc. They promised to pay in return 14,000 golden
coins for their possessions on Mount Athos, 130,000 silver coins for their dependencies
(metochia) in Limnos and outside Athos and 70,000 silver coins as tax (haraç) per year.
They concluded the petition with an unprecedented and clear threat:
If you do not order an imperial document of confirmation, we will sell our pos-
sessions and pay back the gold we borrowed and we will scatter all around the world;
it is certain that our monasteries will be deserted and our taxes, which we customarily
pay in a lump sum (maktug) each year, will be lost.18
The response of the sultan reiterates the reasons for ordering the confiscation and
grants the monks all their requests. The threat to cease paying their taxes weighs heavily
on the Sultan’s decision because the monks were paying with the maktug system, meaning
payment made in advance. In an apologetic manner, the sultan’s order concludes with the
reasoning of the centre. The answer is a clear reflection of Ebu’s Sugud’s legal opinions
avoiding threats we normally encounter in imperial orders.
The reason for interfering now is that they [monks] acquired private possessions
(mülk) by buying and selling royal domains from the peasants. They made them into
vakf for the benefit of the monasteries and they got title deeds and dedication deeds.
They have not been paying their taxes which are obligatory by the Holy Law. They
were paying a tiny lump sum (cüz’i mukataat verüb). It is patently obvious they have
damaged the Treasury of the Muslims, clearly acted contrary to the Holy Law, and
shamefully betrayed the glory of the Sultanate.
On the local level the monks were eager to conclude the unfortunate affair and repur-
chase their properties. The required capital was obtained as we have seen, either through
loan or alms (zyteia). Apart from land, the rest of their properties were repossessed and
made into trusts for the benefit of the monks, travellers and the indigent. The repossession
process was completed in the justice court (kadI court) of the near-by island of Kos. A
series of court proceedings related to the Patmos monastery (hüccets), dating from 1–10
Safer 977/16–25 July 1569, illustrates this process. The bulk of transactions are made in
only one month, from 1–10 Zi’l-kade 977/ 7–17 April 1570 to 21–30 Zi’l-kade 977/28
April-6 May 1570, as the monks would have to travel to the near-by island of Kos to be
present in court.19 These hüccets include documents of sale and validation of vakfs.
Husam son of Murad was the judge on Kos and validated all sale documents,20 whereas
18 Kermeli, Confiscation, Appendix III.
19 Kermeli, Confiscation, Appendix IV.































Central administration versus provincial arbitrary governance 195
his deputy a certain Hasan, son of Kemal, put his seal on all documents making the new
acquisitions into valid and irrevocable trusts.21 By personally supervising the sale, the
judge indicates what is important for the Porte.22 The discretion of the judge in adjudi-
cation is apparent in a series of irregularities in the drawing of the documents. We can
divide them into technical irregularities and irregularities of substance. Ergene questions
the degree to which judicial entries in the judge’s book reflect ‘realities’. According to him
the nature of the connection between the actual processes in the Ottoman court and their
recording ‘may not be as direct or immediate as has been generally assumed in literature’.23
By claiming that the entries were the ‘translations’ of dispute into the language of court,
he questions the representative power of these documents and anathematises scholars’
tendency to accept them as accurate depictions of past realities.24 Despite the fact that the
hüccets of Patmos monastery were notary deeds and had a certain degree of formalistic
rigidity in their drawing, as they were supposed to follow certain established rules, the
kadI of Kos seems to have used his own discretion.25
I. Technical-Structural Irregularities
One cannot fail to notice the uniqueness of the hüccets of Patmos. Upon close scrutiny
they defy a number of standard traditions and rules. In documents of this kind, the two
parties meet in court, their names are registered, and then each one proceeds to make
a statement (ikrar). The statement of the seller describes the property to be sold, its
boundaries, if it is landed, or the particulars for movables, and the price. When the buyer
accepts the property in his statement and the price, as set by the seller, the transaction is
21 Kermeli, Confiscation, Patmos File IV, 4–7, 9, 18, 41, 52–63.
22 R. Gradeva, ‘Orthodox Christians in the Kadi courts: the practice of the Sofia sheriat court, seventeenth
century’, Islamic Law and Society 4/1 (Leiden 1997) 57–60; I. OrtaylI, ‘On the role of the Ottoman-Kadi in
provincial administration’, Turkish Public Administration Annual 3 (Ankara 1976) 18.
23 B. Johansen, ‘Formes de language et fonctions publiques: stéréotypes, témoins et offices dans la preuve par
l’ écrit en droit musulman’, Arabica 44 (1997) 333–76; B. Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in
the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in ÇankIrI and Kastamonu (1652–1744) (Leiden
2003) 141; ‘Evidence in Ottoman courts: oral and written documentation in early-modern courts of Islamic
law’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 24/4 (2004) 471–91, and ‘Document use in Ottoman courts of
law: observations from the sicils of ÇankIrI and Kastamonu’, Turcica 37 (2005) 83–111.
24 Ergene, ‘Document use’, 85.
25 U. Heyd, ‘Some aspects of the Ottoman fetvas’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 32
(1969) 35–56; J. Wakin, The Function of Documents in Islamic Law: The Chapters on sales frome Tahãwî’s
Kitãb al Shurût al Kabîr (New York 1972) 41. There are numerous treatises to facilitate the scribes’ work. Ebu’s
Sugud wrote two treatises, one was instruction to his clerks and the other was about the correct use of language.
































complete. In the hüccets of Patmos, the procedure is reversed because the ikrar of the
buyer precede that of the seller, in this case the representative of the Treasury. This is
in violation of Tahawi’s rules, as set up in his chapter on sales. According to him, the
statement of the seller should be registered first, because the seller initiates the sale and the
buyer is the one who then accepts it.26 There are many reasons why this judicial procedure
was necessary. In court, accepting the price implies that the seller has given his permission.
Also, by putting the buyer’s statement second, he is protected against future false claims
on the part of the seller in a potential lawsuit in which he could argue, for example,
that the buyer acquired the property by usurpation (gasb). Since this procedure in the
provincial court of Kos is reversed an obvious suggestion would be to suppose that the
judge of the provincial court on Kos was ignorant of the procedure and incompetent.
However, by examining other entries in the archive signed by the same judge, we discover
his adherence to the rules.27 Evidently the judge had his own reasons. Perhaps by placing
the statement of the buyer first, an association was made with the legal concept of
presumption. When there is no proof, presumption operates in favour of the second
litigant. It is his statement supported by oath that is admitted as stronger.28 In such a case,
therefore, the statement of the representative of the Treasury would be second in order
to protect him against the buyer’s future claims. If we accept this hypothesis, then it is
apparent that the judge of Kos had the interest of the state at heart.
By contrast, another major irregularity shows that the judge made an effort to keep
the monks content. After sale was complete, the monks would proceed to validate their
repossession as irrevocable trusts. The rules are set by Ebu’s Sugud. As long as properties
are not dedicated to the monastery but rather to poor monks, travellers, and the indigent
the legal process follows the general Islamic rules on trusts.29 The procedure is followed
strictly in the vakIfname of Orfani, a dependency of Dionysiou monastery. Daniel, son of
Manoli the prior, appeared in court with all his title deeds. He delivered the trust to
his trustee (Mütevelli) on the condition that the income will be used for the benefit of
26 The hüccets in the court compilations follow this mainstream Islamic law pattern. See Scer’iyye Sicilleri.
Mahiyeti toplu katalhu ve secme hükümler II (Istanbul 1989) 19–30. The same applies to entries from Bulgaria
in the seventeenth century. See Gradeva, ‘Legal procedure in the kadi’s court according to the documents in the
kadi’s sijills in Bulgaria (17th century)’, paper presented to the ‘Islamic, Hebrew, Ottoman Law’ conference
(Manchester 1991) 4–7.
27 Patmos, File III, 3, 24, 26, 29, 41, 44.
28 Wakin, The Function, 56; J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford 1964) 194.
29 Following Qadikhan’s prescriptions, the founder must make his freehold into a trust and deliver it to the
trustee of his choice. Because of disagreement in Islamic law about the process, the founder is then expected to
abrogate the dedication quoting the opinion of Abu Hanifa. The trustee will employ the opinions of Abu Yusuf
and Shaibani to enable the judge to proclaim a verdict in his favour, since their opinion is accepted in practice.
Thus the trusts could become valid and irrevocable. For the advice of Ebu’s Sugud on the matter see, M.E.































Central administration versus provincial arbitrary governance 197
poor monks and travellers.30 According to the Islamic laws on trusts, the property to be
dedicated should be the freehold of the founder. One cannot make as vakf, property that
is not clearly his/hers.31 In the case of Patmos, however, the judge, or rather his deputy,
made the properties into valid and irrevocable vakfs fifteen days before their repurchase
from the Fisc.32 It would be naïve to suppose that the kadI was not informed of the irregu-
larity. Due to this irregularity he refrained from sealing these documents personally. The
reason for such an astonishingly high disregard for Islamic law can be adduced from
the imperial order sent to the judge of Kos and the representative of the Treasury on 17
November 1569.
You should register in a registration book (defter) all church vakfs in the said district.
If the priests and the monks accept [to pay] the standard tapu a stranger33 would pay,
upon their acceptance, you should put the vakfs attached to each church in the
manner set forth, in their charge. Take the tapu tax for the Treasury, give them title
deeds and let them have the disposal of them. If, however, they do not accept the
vakfs attached to the churches and for the settlement due an outsider would pay, you
should give the properties to others among the peasants who request them.
Obviously the monks would be eager to ensure that outsiders did not snatch their
properties. The Sultan gave them a priority over the peasants. The monks must have used
as an argument for the reversal of the procedure a phrase in the firman saying ‘put their
properties in their charge (guhdelerine edüb) and then collect the tax and give them title
deeds’. Making properties into inaccessible trusts was the best method of taking charge of
them. By viewing the activities of a group of peasants who bought former properties of the
monastery, we are better able to understand the fears of the monks. The judge exercised
all limits of discretion to mollify the monks. Though aware of the transgression of the law,
the judge accommodated local demand, while he also refrained from personally sealing
these documents.
II. Irregularities of Substance
Husam Efendi also seems to treat favourably a group of Christians buying former
monastic properties in court. The interaction between these Christians and the judge
seems to be peculiar. Although Ebu’s Sugud repeatedly forbade the sale of arable land and
30 N. Papazoglou, MetaQrasm aena Tourkik ga ÖEccraQa toũ Metoxaiou ÑOrQa ng tg̃z Mong̃z Dionusaiou toũ ÑAcaiou
ÖOrouz (1576–1733) (Kavala 1987) Appendix 2.
31 Düzdag, Ebussuud FetvalarI, d.301, 76; Schacht, ‘Early Doctrines on Waqf’, 447–49.
32 Patmos, File IV, 5–7, 13, 24–28, 30–39, 41–53.
































explained in the imperial orders his legal reasoning, the local judge in Kos applied different
rules to different groups. When the monks attempted to repossess their lands, Ebu’s
Sugud’s prescriptions were precisely followed. They bought only the usufruct of fields and
they were forbidden from using them as private property.34
The judge however, was not as meticulous when registering transactions between the
representative of the Treasury and lay Christians. On the same day he granted the usufruct
of fields to monks, 1–10 Zi’l-kade 977/ 7–17 April 1570, he registered the sale of lands to
three Christians with a final and irrevocable sale. Yorgi Nimeku, Izmali Nimeku and
Izmali Alyu Christians from Kalymnos Island castle bought a field (tarla) of one kile sown
with seed and five beehives that were formerly the trust of Kire church, a dependency of
Patmos monastery.35 In his statement Ahmet Çelebi, the representative of the tax collector
(emin) of Rhodes, Yakub Bey, sold the field for 200 silver coins with a definite and
irrevocable sale (beygi katgi ile beyg edüb). The same Christians together with a certain
papa Constandin Samila bought on the same day another field of 6 kile sown with seed
belonging to the same church with a definite sale.36 Their acquisitions included also a
vineyard with olive trees in Kato Yalos and Arkos in Kalymnos, former trust of Kebere
church, dependency of Patmos monastery, for 300 silver coins.37 These Christians from
Kalymnos Island must have been testing the flexibility of the judge when they attempted
to buy in another entry, apart from fruit bearing trees also the land beneath.38 It was a
popular belief that planting trees densely, to prevent any other crop from growing, led to
de jure ownership of the ground. As Imber has argued, Ebu’s Sugud rejects this view and
claims that if the plants are removed the land reverts to the Treasury.39 Both the judge and
the tax collector probably knew this. The latter in his statement accepted the sale of the
34 The phrase used is as follows: ‘I have given the aforementioned field to the said monk for a tapu of
2000 silver coins. I have received the tax on behalf of the Treasury. From today the monk should plough and
cultivate it. No one should interfere, if he pays his taxes’. Patmos File IV, 8; 14; 32.
35 Patmos, File IV, 43.
36 Patmos, File IV, 17.
37 Patmos, File IV, 38.
38 Patmos, File IV, 48.
39 For orchards and trees in Ottoman law see C. Imber, ‘The status of orchards and fruit-trees in Ottoman
law’, Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, Prof. Tayyib Gökbilgin HatIra SayIsI (Istanbul 1982) 763–74; H. Inalcik,
‘Islamization’, 102–103. It is important to note the striking resemblance between the treatment of trees and
orchards in Ottoman law with the Byzantine laws of emphyteusis. The term in Greek means gplanting’. The
peasant who planted trees in someone else’s property acquired the usufruct of the property on condition he
did not leave the property unattended. His right on the property can be transferred and inherited. The only
obligation is to pay yearly a tax called emphyteutikos kanonas or emphyteuma, either in kind or in money. In
addition, the peasant is obliged, if he sells his right or transfers it, to ask the permission of the owner who in
return can levy, for his permission, up to 2% of the value of planting. This tax is called eisdektikon. See for
more information on emphyteusis, M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht: Die nachklassische Entwicklungen,
Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft X.3.3.1–2 (Munich 1975) 308–12; I. Konidaris, Tog Daikaion tg̃s
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trees but refrained from the mention of the land. In this case, because the statement of the
Christians precedes, the representative of the central administration is invested with
the right to omit an item, another obvious advantage of the reversal of the procedure.
However, although the Christians of Kalymnos Island failed to appropriate the land
upon which fruit-bearing trees grow, Papa Marko, acting as the agent for his son Nikitas
residing inside the Leros castle, succeeded. On the same day, he bought a vineyard and its
ground, again a former property of the monastery, for 210 silver coins.40
Unpleasant as the affair might have been, even incomprehensible in all its legal
technicalities for the monks, it demonstrates effectively that the monks understood the
complexities and peculiarities of the system. When they petitioned to the Sultan they
were firm on the conditions they attached to the normalization of their status. By openly
threatening to disperse and deprive the Fisc of valuable income, they managed to have
their voices heard by the centre. Unfortunately, our sources cannot provide us with
an answer concerning the web of social support they were employing. Most importantly,
the sources remain silent as to who advised them in their course of action. It would
be interesting to know if their verbalization of a threat to the Sultan was a result of
calculating information from inside, or an act of desperation.
On the other hand, the centre, be that the Sultan himself or his jurisconsult Ebu’s
Sugud, were quick to understand the repercussions of their actions and alleviate concerns
arising from them. Ebu’s Sugud exhibited all his mastery in Islamic law in order to
accommodate the monks’ needs as long as they accepted the new arrangements. Thus, the
Byzantine monastic collectivity was recognized even if Ebu’s Sugud had to employ legal
stratagems.
When the affair was transferred to the local level, the judge of Kos was even more
adventurous than the jurisconsult. He used his own discretion to safeguard the interests
of the centre. By reversing the procedure he furnished the seller i.e. the Fisc, with an
advantage against future claims. Amidst the ‘chaos’ following the order of confiscation,
he lent a sympathetic ear to the monks’ fears of losing their properties to outsiders. He
allowed them to rededicate their properties, before they had acquired full ownership, in
direct defiance of Islamic law. The limitations of our sources again do not permit us to
explore more the web of local actors and their interaction with the judge. Thus, we cannot
explain the reasons for his favouritism towards the Christians of Kalymnos and Leros
islands. Because the same names are involved in illicit transactions of land, we can only
suspect that their ties must have been strong. After all, the judge transgressed the most
important of the Sultan’s orders. He alienated public property, and this may be seen as an
instance of corruption. Whatever the case though, the judge had been instrumental in
keeping all sides content.
Since the confiscation and repossession of monastic properties in the late 16th century
affected many monastic communities in the Balkans, the affair allows us to draw interest-
ing conclusions on issues concerning the centre and periphery, as well as decline and
































transformation in the Ottoman Empire. Based on Sc erif Mardin’s seminal work on centre
and periphery41 scholars primarily concentrated on the definition of the terms and the
examination of the power of the centre vis-à-vis local ‘elite’ groups42. The centre-periphery
discussion became part of the extensive discourse on the Ottoman polity as an extreme
patrimonial state and subsequently as the main constituent of decline.43 According to
the advocates of this approach, the earlier period until the end of the 16th century is
characterized as a kind of ‘enlightened’ despotism.44
The deconstruction of the Ottoman decline paradigm was initiated by specialists
who, as Darling argues, felt that it fails to explain Ottoman transformation and change.
According to Darling ‘it is teleological: because we know that eventually the Ottoman
became a weaker power and finally disappeared, every earlier difficulty experienced
becomes a ‘seed of decline’, and Ottoman successes and sources of strength vanish
from the record’.45 The emphasis put forward in the revisionist approach is not dismissive
of any of the Ottomans’ efforts to transform and address new challenges but discusses
the pace of adaptation to new challenges.46 These new challenges are illustrated
41 Sc. Mardin, ‘Center-periphery relations: a key to Turkish politics’, Daedalus 102 (1973) 169–190.
42 The theme of centre and periphery in the social sciences has been argued with vigour since the 1960s. G.W.
Lapidus, E.W. Walker, ‘Nationalism, regionalism and federalism: centre-periphery relations in post-communist
Russia’, in G. Lapidus (ed.), The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Westview 1995) 79–114; U. Hannerz,
‘Flows, boundaries and hybrids: keywords in transnational anthropology’ Mana 3/1 (1997) 7–39; S.N.
Eisenstadt, ‘Mobilization center-periphery structures’, in S.N. Eisenstadt, S. Rokkan (eds.), Building States
and Nations (London 1973). For the historical approach, see S. Langholm, ‘On the concepts of Center and
Periphery’, Journal of Peace Research, 8/3.4 (1971) 273–78. For a definition on centrality see J. Galtung,
‘A structural theory of Imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research 8/2 (1971) 81–117.
43 B. Lewis, ‘Some reflections on the decline of the Ottoman empire’, Studia Islamica 1 (1958) 111–27 and
‘Ottoman observers of Ottoman decline’, Islamic Studies 1(1962) 71–87; P. Fodor, ‘State and society, crisis and
reform, in 15th –17th century Ottoman Mirrors for Princes’, Acta Orientalia Hungarica 60 (1986) 217–40;
D. Howard, ‘Ottoman historiography and the literature of ‘decline’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’,
Journal of Asian History 22 (1988) 52–77; H. Inalcik, ‘The heyday and decline of the Ottoman empire’, The
Cambridge History of Islam, I (Cambridge 1970) ‘Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman adminis-
tration’, Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, T. Naff, R. Owen (eds.) (London 1977) 27–52;
M. Heper, ‘Center and Periphery in the Ottoman empire: with special reference to the nineteenth century’,
International Political Science Review 1/1 (1980) 81–105.
44 H. Gerber, State, Society and Law in Islam: Ottoman law in Comparative Perspective (New York 1997)
129; S. Faroqhi, ‘Crisis and change, 1590–1699’, in H. Inalcik, D. Quataert (eds.), Economic and Social History
of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914 (Cambridge 1994) 411–636.
45 L. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman
Empire 1560–1660 (Leiden 1996) 5.
46 R. Murphey, ‘The Veliyuddin Telhis: notes on the sources and interrelations between Koçi Bey and
contemporary writers of Advice to Kings’ Belleten 43 (1979) 547–61; R. A. Abou-el-Haj, ‘The Ottoman
Nasihatname as a discourse over ‘Morality’,’ Revue d’histoire maghrébine 14 (1987) 15–30. S. Demirci,
‘Complaints about Avâriz assessment and payment in the Avâriz-tax system: an aspect of the relationship
between centre and periphery: a case study of Kayseri, 1618–1700’, Journal of the Economic and Social History
of the Orient 46/4 (2003) 437–74; R. Murphey, ‘Continuity and discontinuity in Ottoman administrative theory
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47 L. Peirce, ‘Changing perceptions of the Ottoman empire: the early centuries’, Mediterranean Historical
Review 19/1 (2004) 23; J. Hathaway, ‘Problems of periodization in Ottoman history: the fifteenth through the
eighteenth centuries’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 20/2 (1996) 25–31.
48 Inalcik, ‘Adâletnâmeler’, Belgeler 2/3–4 (1965) 49–145; Ergene, ‘On Ottoman justice: interpretations in
conflict (1600–1800)’, Islamic Law and Society 8/1 (2001) 52–87.
49 M.K. Masud, B.Messick, D. S. Powers, Islamic Legal gnterpretations: Muftis and their fatwas (Harvard
1996) 28–29; W.B. Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad closed?’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 16/1
(1984) 3–41; B. Johansen, ‘Die sündige, gesunde Amme: Moral und gesetzliche Bestimmung (hukm) im
islamischen Recht’, Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden 1999)
189–219.
50 Imber, Ebu’s Sugud, 271.
51 Kermeli, ‘Church Vakfs’, 141–157.
52 Heyd, Ottoman documents on Palestine, 1552–1615 (Oxford 1960) 49; Inalcik, ‘The Ottoman decline and
its effects upon the Reaya’, The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy˜ (London 1978) 346;
idem, ‘Tax collection, embezzlement and bribery in Ottoman finances’, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 15
(1991) 326–46.
53 Ergene, Local Court, 109.
54 H. Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective (New York 1994)
182, 173.
in the negotiation efforts between the two sides and function as evidence of transfor-
mation, transgressing our traditional views on periodization, since even the advocates of
transformation argue that change did not occur before the beginning of the 17th century.47
With regard to Ottoman legal studies, the decisions and acts of both the jurisconsult
in Istanbul and the judge on Kos renegotiate the image of the Sultan as the sole protector
of the aggrieved, inherent in the official ideology.48 This image somewhat alienates
the other actors in the administration of justice, presenting them as mere instruments of
‘divine’ justice. The legal opinions of Ebu’s Sugud, regardless whether they are an example
of independent reasoning (ijtihad)49 or a manipulation of pre-existing concepts50, demon-
strate a well balanced accommodation of both the needs of the Porte and the demands of
the local society51. Thus, the role of the jurisconsult goes beyond that of a subservient
subject.
In addition, the issue of judicial corruption, central in the decline-transformation
debate, is reflected in the actions of the judge in Kos. The degree of judicial corruption, the
process of adjudication and the exorbitant legalism of the court are issues for discussion.
The advocates of the decline model consider serious corruption and disorganization as
responsible for the decline of the efficiency and honesty of the provincial administration.52
Ergene depicts a very grave picture of the judicial corruption. He claims that corruption
and illegal practices of the kadIs in Anatolia and Rumelia during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were extensive.53 Gerber, on the other hand, holds a different opinion,
based on research of Books of Complaints (Sc ikayet Defterleri). He concludes that the
extent of corruption in the Ottoman bureaucracy is probably exaggerated and that ‘the
supremacy of the kadI in the Ottoman legal system in the post-sixteenth century period
































not, his independence from the centre is apparent in the number of major and minor trans-
gressions of rules and laws, although judicial documents are designed to conceal rather
than reveal such activities. Nevertheless, we cannot argue that his administration of law
was whimsical, based on his arbitrary discretion. Such a conclusion would have accepted
a rule-driven orientation attached to the Weberian model of ‘kadI justice’55 that ignores, as
Ergene rightfully argues, the extra-judicial ties between provincial courts and local com-
munities. In the Ottoman Empire the kadI is more than a judge.56 He is also a mediator
and arbitrator and his settlements satisfy the law as well as the needs of the community;
his role is similar to that played by the kadi of Kos.
In conclusion the confiscation and re-possession of monastic properties at the end
of the sixteenth century is an instructive example of the dialogue between centre and
periphery. The periphery, on the one hand, represented by the monastic communities is
successfully negotiating the terms for the normalization of their relation with the centre.
The centre’s decisions, on the other hand, assert the limits of the negotiation, while the
jurisconsult’s opinions included in the sultanic decrees reflect the accommodation between
the Porte’s interests and the needs of the locals. Overly schematized paradigms are thus
replaced by the example of a polity in dialogue with local communities, which undergo
continual reformation. The activities of the local judge in Kos manifest the extra-judicial
ties between local courts and local communities. The judge shows flexibility and
awareness that custom and the needs of the community were fundamental to the
formation of normative law and practice. The application of law and the procedure in the
court of Kos (Idstanköy) echo the role of the kadI as the mediator who attempts to appease
all. This role does not, however, inhibit the judge from being involved in petty corruption,
even if he has to violate explicit orders of the centre.
The confiscation and repossession of monastic properties in Mount Athos and
Patmos should not be considered as the seed of decline preceding the seventeenth-century
crises. It could rather serve as an example of a central administration in negotiation with
peripheral actors.
55 Gerber, State, 176; Ergene, Local Court, 115.
56 Ergene, Local Court, 195.
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